



NATURAL RESOURCE ENDOWMENT AND YOUTH EDUCATION DYSFUNCTION IN BAYELSA STATE

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Abstract

This paper investigates an uncommon and lackluster attitude towards education among youths of Bayelsa State. The Rentier State Theory (RST) is adopted as its theoretical handle. Primary and secondary sources of information were deployed in the study; with 20 randomly sampled communities of four local government areas of Bayelsa State. The paper makes an interesting insight into a rare connection between natural resource endowment and youth education, even as part of a growing concern on how to take youth away from criminality and violent conflicts in many complex conflict-ridden societies. Nigeria, and in particular, Bayelsa State need to make more effort at making education a key instrument in both national and sub-national development. The paper identifies rents/royalties from oil and gas in Bayelsa State as the major culprit. Furthermore, it asserts that life of flamboyance and affluence without commensurate hard work, has caused disdain for education among the youths of Bayelsa State.


Keywords: Rents, RST, Youth Bulge, Education, Bayelsa State

Introduction

Bayelsa State has experienced its fair share of what is commonly referred to as the youth bulge and the accompanying risks experienced globally there-from (Urdal, 2004, 2006; Urdal&Hoelscher, 2009; Ortiz & Cummins, 2012; Agbor, Taiwo & Smith, 2012; Resnick & Thurlow, 2015). However, if education and training are good investments for the youth, especially in a resource rich state as Bayelsa State, why would her huge youth cohort not exploit the opportunity to the maximum?

The oil industry which serves as the mainstay of the state in Nigeria has from the commencement of oil exploration and exploitation not taken along oil host communities and their ever upsurging youth population. A combination of factors is responsible for this. The existing federal laws regulating the oil industry, for example, the Oil Pipelines Act (2004) is not community friendly. Also, the oil industry's negative effects on the environment and the accompanying compensation regimes consider little or no place for youths who see themselves as being marginalised and alienated from the compensation regime and worse still are barely educated to compete for available job places; instead favour chiefs and local elites who parade their communities with their wealth (Isemunah, 2012, p.335).

Regrettably, this unfriendly compensation regime which places wealth in the hands of chiefs and local elites, principally politicians has sadly created in Bayelsa State an ugly trend better referred to as a rentier mentality, what Minnis (2006, p.976) refers to as “the disjunction in the popular mind between work and education and between income and reward”, a sense of ‘awoof’, a life of comfort, affluence and flamboyance without commensurate hard work, what is in popular





parlance referred to as ‘I am loyal mentality’ in order to get monetary or material favours from politicians.

It is a mentality and a way of life which has transcended or progressed into advanced forms such as oil bunkering, the proliferation of artisanal refineries, hostage-taking/ kidnapping, buying of firearms and afterwards laying down of such purchased arms and ammunitions in exchange for cash from the Presidential Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria while it lasted, etc; the totality of which has caused a disdain for hard work with a negative impact on youth education in the state. It is these effects arising there-from (i.e. the rentier mentality on youth education) that this paper investigates in Bayelsa State. The rest of the paper is structured in the following sequence: theoretical framework, conceptual framework, the methodology employed, and discussion of findings.

Theoretical Framework


The analysis of this paper is reliant on the ‘Rentier State Theory (RST)’ popularised by scholars of Middle Eastern and North African extraction (Mahdavy, 1970; Skocpol, 1982; Beblawi, 1987). According to Gary (2011, p.1) Rentier State Theory (RST) is a,

political economy theory that seeks to explain state-society relations in states that generate a large proportion of their income from rents, or externally-derived, unproductively-earned payments, as its most basic assumption, RST holds that, since the state receives this external income and distributes it to society, it is relieved of having to impose taxation, which in turn means that it does not have to offer concessions to society such as a democratic bargain or a development strategy.

Thus, a rentier state is a state reliant not on the surplus production of the domestic population or economy but on externally generated revenues or ‘rents’, usually derived from the extractive industry such as oil. Yates (1996, p.18) identified rent as producing certain effects that include (a) the rentier as a parasite that violates “the most sacred doctrine of the liberal ethos: hard work”, (b) a rentier mentality (c) the proliferation of the service sector to the detriment of agriculture, and (d) the ascendancy of undemocratic tendencies in rentier states.

The point of departure for this paper is taken from items (a) and (b) above that create in a state and in her citizens a disdain for hard work and education but instead on an avid interest in quick money (El-Ghonemy, 1998; Amuzegar, 1999; Gawdat, 1999; Mazawi, 1999; Minnis, 2006).

It is presently observed that in Bayelsa State youths show a dislike for hard work and education. They desire a life full of pleasure, but without necessarily working for it. The ascendancy of this trend is seen to have developed from the presence of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) exploring for oil and gas in Bayelsa State; whose presence portrays a false life pattern among the youths, especially as oil TNCs and their staff, local elites, community chiefs, etc, are seen lavishly spending money in host communities, etc. The vanity of the glamour and shine that emit from TNCs’ presence in a community, the lifestyles of local elites and community chiefs, etc, create in youths an array of false lifestyles that threaten education and security of states with a bulging youth population (Mauro, 1998; Birdsall, Pinckney & Sabot, 2000; Gylfason, 2001a&b; Kronenberg, 2002; Marsland, 2011).





Conceptual Framework

The topic under consideration would ordinarily compel a conceptual survey on natural resources and their impact on resource endowed states. However, arising from the avalanche of literature and research endeavours undertaken on the subject and their impacts on such states (Young, 1981, 1982; Karl, 1997; Klare, 2002; Falola, & Genova, 2005; Peel, 2009; Kashi, 2010; Collier, 2010; Barma, Kaiser, Le & Vinuela, 2012), this paper skips such discourses and instead dwells on the youth bulge-security dilemma in resource-rich enclaves as Bayelsa State.

Constitutional and organisational provisions and the diversities arriving there-from deny youths a generally acceptable definition. The 1999 Nigerian Constitution envisages a youth within the age limit that commences from eighteen years (which bestows on them an array of opportunities ranging from exercising franchise, private life to property ownership, etc.) and corresponding responsibilities as well (payment of tax, penalties for crime committed). This provision runs parallel to youth delineations among agencies within the United Nations (as shown on Table 1).

Table 1: Youth Age Delineations

Entity/Instrument/Organisation	Age
UN Secretariat/UNESCO/ILO	Youth 15-24
UN Habitat (Youth Fund)	Youth 15-32
UNICEFF/WHO/UNFPA	Adolescent: 10-19 Young People: 10-24 Youth: 15-24
UNICEFF/The Convention on Rights of the Child	Child under 18
The African Youth Charter	Youth: 15-35

UNDP (2004) Youth Strategy, 2014-2017

The African Youth Charter (2006, pp.3, 18-19) which simply refers to youth as “every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years” further provided in **Article 13** and **Article 26** a number of rights (e.g. every young person shall have the right to education of good quality...the value of multiple forms of education, including formal, non-formal, informal, distance learning and life-long learning) and commensurate duties (e.g. every young person shall have responsibilities towards his family and society, the State, and the international community).

The strict observance of such provisions among African states would be a further research; however, the burden of this paper lies on the responsibility component of **Article 26** of the African Youth Charter. That is to what extent have youths been responsible citizens? How has the education acquired been useful to them and to the society at large? How beneficial or otherwise is Africa’s large youth population?

Whereas the UN Youth Report (2004, p. iv, 2005, p.iii) observes that “young people should never be seen as a burden on any society, but as its most precious asset...young people hold the key to society's future. Their ambitions, goals and aspirations for peace, security, development and human rights are often in accord with those of society as a whole”, research has shown otherwise. Globally the phenomenon of youth bulge has attracted an enormous literature and attention; the implications of their gargantuan upsurge to the security, political, economic, and social landscapes of their communities, local, state and federal authorities are well noted. Among others, a seminal work in this direction is Moller’s ‘*Youth as a Force in the Modern World*’

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published since 1968. He contends that “historical evidence appears to indicate that the subversion of any established government...young people provide the driving force and often, to a large extent, the intellectual and organizational leadership” (Moller, 1968, p.256).

In extending this discourse, others contend that an aspect of the youth bulge that has attracted enormous attention is the demography-security component especially when the age distribution is in favour of the male which in most instances has the tendency of drifting into violent conflicts (Keyfitz, 1964-65; Goldstone, 1991, 2001, 2002; Mesquida&Wiener, 1996; Cincotta, 2004; Urdal, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011; Sommers, 2006; Sciubba, 2010; Goldstone, Kaufmann &Toft, 2011; Hoffman &Jamal, 2012). According to Weiner and Russell, (2001, p.3) the centrality in the demography-security argument considers “how changes in demographic variables (population size, growth, distribution, and composition) influence threats (real or perceived) to a country's political stability and security; how governments respond to demographic trends; and how governments attempt to change demographic variables in order to enhance national security.”

Identifying demography as a critical element in youth violence is a major milestone, but more critical should be what motivating factors propel youths to violent conflicts? An array of such elements as who are the elites with an enormous appeal to youths, what influence do such factors as place of residence, marriage, sense of alienation as a response to education and employment impairments, etc, have on the demography-security discourse?

The starting point to the discourse on the causes of violent conflict, especially within the context of Bayelsa state, is that a bulging youth population is a reality, however, “many act as if they are members of an outcast minority, only considered relevant in times of electioneering campaigns and other illegal escapades” (Sommers, 2015, p.3). So a sense of alienation from the mainstream political, economic and social paraphernalia of the state is assumed or seen to exist either in reality or in the subconscious minds of the youths (Sommers, 2007). The prevalence of such sentiments creates a ripe atmosphere for violent behaviour. A preponderance of social research indicates that the months following general elections in Nigeria are accentuated by high incidents of violent crimes; a sort of displaying that we are idle and the need for an activity (may be a money generating one) to keep themselves busy and when such are not easily come by, violent crimes become the readily available substitute (Orji &Uzodi, 2012; Paden, 2012).

Very Important Persons (VIPs), Non-Parents Adults (NPAs) in form of mentors, or elite influence has been a key source of positive youth influence in most societies, especially in Western societies (Greenberger, Chen, &Beam, 1998; Chen, Greenberger, Farruggia, Bush &Dong, 2003; Hurd, Zimmerman, &Xue, 2009; Haddad, Chen &Greenberger, 2011; Sterrett, Jones, MCKee&Kincaid, 2011; Bowers, Geldhof, Schmid, Napolitano, Minor &Lerner, 2012). Richard Lerner and colleagues (in Longfellow, 2013, p.1) renowned for their five ‘Cs’ of Positive Youth Development: connection, caring, competence, character, and confidence, were succinct in advocating that,

Knowing adults with whom the young people enjoy spending time and who provide them with encouragement helps them envision a hopeful and productive life for themselves, and this promotes positive outcomes. The more important non-parent adults there are in a kid’s life the stronger is the youth’s





vision of a hopeful personal future, which, in turn, leads to greater confidence, character, and caring/compassion.

Such scenarios are hardly come by in Bayelsa State. Youth clusters in the state are mostly noticed around political office holders or prominent politicians (godfathers, kingmakers), etc, solely for pecuniary reasons and not for gaining some rare or charismatic qualities. Thus, youth clusters are rarely seen around renowned academics or religious leaders because such elite types are assumed by youths not to have what they need most, money and connection. So a mismatch of priorities among youths is commonplace. Academics that are supposed to be the ideal role models in influencing their future are distanced from and rather find solace in politicians who provide only temporary largesse.

In close relation to the above, research has shown that neighbourhood influence impacts greatly on educational outcomes, involvement in violent activities, etc (Garner &Raudenbush, 1991; Crane, 1991; Duncan, 1994; Elliot, Wilson, Huizinga, Sampson, Elliot &Rankin, 1996; Boardman, &Saint Onge, 2005). The neighbourhoods in which most youths reside in their adolescence, formative or school age impacts positively or otherwise on youth's educational future (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov&Sealand, 1993; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan &Aber, 1997; Leventhal, &Brooks-Gunn, 2000). The enormity of this scenario on youths in an oil bearing community could better be imagined; especially where sudden affluence from oil rents is stupendously displayed to the admiration of youths who see the holders of such wealth as mentors or role models; hitherto unconscious that the perceived mentors' lifestyles are a life of mirage. Therefore, youth bulges and subsequent violence are most regrettable; a scenario Kaplan (1996, p.16) characterises as “out of school, unemployed male youth that seem to be everywhere as loose molecules in an unstable social fluid that threatened to ignite”.

The volatility of youth bulges in most societies is equally premised on the popular saying, ‘too many young men with not enough to do’ (Cincotta, Engelman &Anastasion, 2003). A World Bank (2011) study also indicates that “one in two young people who join a rebel movement cites unemployment as the main reason for doing so”. The job-conflict relations considered here relates to the incongruence between curriculum provisions and job placement needs in life after school for youths in Africa. It is most frustrating that youths are either not educated or their educational attainments are mismatched with the job-placement requirements. The reason is that the curriculum in most African states is too theoretical and so could not create in learners the skills required for productive employment or engagement in economic and social life outside school (Egbe, 2016). The effects derivable thereof are twofold. First, where youths who hitherto had wished to get employed to cut an identity, independence, and to impress young females (Cincotta, et al, 2003; ACCORD &OSAA, 2015) fail to secure befitting jobs, the ensuing frustration creates in them a sense of exclusion and a natural attraction towards violence (IISS, 2015). Secondly, most educated youths would naturally be engaged in menial jobs to enrich a few (Oxfam, 2014).

Finally, the preponderance of youth related conflicts hinges on age distribution vis-à-vis marriage. While Moller's (1968) seminal work implied a male dominated age distribution as a conflict attractor, others attribute the inclination of youths to conflict behaviours to male-to-female sex ratio and the percentage of the male cohort engaged in marriage (Mesquida,





&Wiener, 1999; Hudson &den-Boer, 2005; Hartmann, 2006). In advancing this argument, Hudson &den-Boer (2007, p.19) note that,

The criminal behaviour of unmarried men is many times higher than the criminal behaviour of married men, and a reliable predictor of a downturn in reckless, antisocial, illegal and violent behaviour by young adult males is marriage. If this transition cannot be effected for a sizeable proportion of a society's young men, the society is likely to become less stable.

Germane as this argument may be, marriage as an inhibitor of youth bulges and violence in Bayelsa State may not stand the test of time. This is because the communal life in Bayelsa State, to a large extent, is not so sacrosanct on what male youth venture into, such as sexual relations. Sexual relations are easily consummated and terminated with ease that male youth marital status is never a stringent barrier to youth proclivity towards violence.

This section has noted a number of factors responsible for the demography-conflict nexus; suffice to add that a number of conflict attractors examined above are specifically germane to Bayelsa State, while others are not.

Methodology

The study adopted a descriptive survey reliant on primary and secondary sources. The bivariate analysis was adopted (i.e. the analysis of two variables at the same time, for the purpose of determining the relationship between them. The variables under study here are the concept of rentierism and its effect on youth education in Bayelsa State). Simple percentages requiring of respondents to indicate either 'yes' or 'no' was utilised. Simple random sampling was employed to select at least 20 persons from some randomly selected five communities from four local government areas in Bayelsa State (as shown in Table 2 below) which culminated in a sample size of 400.





Table 2 Sampled LGAs & Communities by Sex Distribution of Respondents

LGA	Communities	Male		Female		Total	
		No	%	No	%	No	%
Southern Ijaw	Oporoma	12	60	08	40	20	100
	Amassoama	11	55	09	45	20	100
	Ogobiri	15	75	05	25	20	100
	Furupah	08	40	12	60	20	100
	Koluama	14	70	06	30	20	100
Total		60	-	40	-	100	100
Ekeremor	Ekeremoh Town	12	60	08	40	20	100
	Aleibiri	08	40	12	60	20	100
	Isampou	11	55	09	45	20	100
	Ojobo	12	60	08	40	20	100
	Ndoro	13	65	07	35	20	100
Total		56	-	44	-	100	100
Brass	Twon Brass	16	80	04	20	20	100
	Iwoama	12	60	08	40	20	100
	Okpoama	11	55	09	45	20	100
	Akassa	08	40	12	60	20	100
	Sangana	09	45	11	55	20	100
Total		56	-	44	-	100	100
Ogbia	Ogbia Town	12	60	08	40	20	100
	Otuasega	11	55	09	45	20	100
	Elebele	09	45	11	55	20	100
	Otuoke	13	45	07	35	20	100
	Oloibiri	14	70	06	30	20	100
Total		59	-	41	-	100	100

Source: Field work, 2015

A total of 400 sets of questionnaire were administered on the basis of a minimum of 20 per community within the sampled local government areas. The respondents in Southern Ijaw LGA were 60 males and 40 females, Ekeremor and Brass LGAs simultaneously had 56 males and 44 females respectively, while in Ogbia LGA 59 and 41 respondents fell into male and females categories respectively.

Furthermore, determining the actual responses of residents of the capital city local government area (i.e. the Yenagoa Local Government Area, YELGA) using a total of 185 respondents were undertaken to assess the rentier impact on youth education in Bayelsa state. The popular position from Table 3 is ‘Very Strong’; which implies that oil presence negatively impacted on youth education and a culture of reading in Bayelsa State.






Table 3 Actual Responses and Their Percentages on Effects of Rentier Mentality on Education

Community	VS	S	W	VW	Total	Popular Position
Igbogene %	85 46%	45 24.3	30 16.2	25 13.5	185 100	V Strong
Ovom %	106 57.3	35 19	28 15.1	16 8.6	185 100	V Strong
Biseni %	120 64.9	40 21.6	15 8.1	10 5.4	185 100	V Strong
Zarama %	90 48.6	52 28.1	30 16.2	13 7.1	185 100	V Strong
Agudama-Ekpetiama %	130 70.3	30 16.2	18 9.7	7 3.8	185 100	V Strong
Akaibiri %	86 46.5	40 21.6	34 18.4	25 13.5	185 100	V Strong
Polaku %	110 59.5	38 20.5	21 11.4	16 8.6	185 100	V Strong
Ogboloma %	140 75.7	18 9.7	15 8.1	12 6.5	185 100	V Strong
Fangbe %	132 71.3	21 11.4	19 10.3	13 7.0	185 100	V Strong
Azikoro %	115 62.2	35 18.9	20 10.8	15 8.1	185 100	V Strong

Key: V.S=Very Strong, S=Strong, W=Weak, VW=Very Weak

Effort was also made to categorise the effects of rentierism on a number of templates as shown on Table 4 below.

Table 4 Categories of Effects of Rentierism at Individual Level

Categories of Rentier Effects on Youths	No. of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Dislike for education	145	78%
Disdain for hard-work/laziness	102	55%
Increase in youth restiveness	118	64%
Increased school dropout	125	67%
Untimely deaths	50	27%
Increased cultism	105	57%
Increased prostitution	86	46%

It could be observed that the percentages representing ‘Dislike for Education’ (78%) and ‘Increase in School Dropout’ (67%) were the highest among the 185 respondents within the





capital city LGA. Furthermore, responding separately to the effects identified below, 102 respondents (55%) argue that oil presence creates in youths a disdain for hard-work and in its place enthrone laziness, 105 respondents (57%) say there is an increase in cultism and cult groups, 86 respondents (46%) argue for an increase in prostitution, while 118 respondents (64%) say there is youth restiveness which in most occasions results in untimely deaths (27%).

What is noticed from the foregoing discussion is that oil presence in Bayelsa State creates a rentier mentality with its basic characteristics in (a) disdain for hard-work, (b) desire for quick money (a life of luxury), (c) disdain for education and a reading culture, etc. It is worrisome to state that where all or isolated cases as identified above persist, education suffers and this is because pursuing education as a route to wealth or wellbeing takes an undue time that most youths find unbearable. It is in similar perspective that Minnis (2006, p.975) posits in the case of Arab students that “...dependence on unearned income may be linked to educational underachievement, disdain for work and lack of interest in formal learning.”

Discussion of Findings: Rentier Mentality, Youths Bulge and Education in Bayelsa State

Oil presence ought to inspire and create in youths of Bayelsa State a hunger for education in order to participate and benefit from the presence of the oil industry within their locality. This could be made possible by exploiting the limited educational avenues especially as educational attainment is causally linked to economic growth of an individual and to a nation at large (Hanushek & Kimko, 2000; Haushek & Wobmann, 2007). Paradoxically, the rentier-youth bulge nexus creates a couple of discomfiting scenarios in most third world countries rich in mineral resources. Oil presence in Bayelsa State creates a false sense of sweet life, what is colloquially referred to as ‘awoof’ money among youths; no thanks to all the dramatis personnel (e.g. the political elites, oil TNC workers, etc) that flaunt and create such a false atmosphere.

The consequences of such an atmosphere on youths are enormous and costly as well; obviously that a rentier mentality creates a couple of illusions on youths anywhere oil mineral resources are found. The Middle East is replete with such cases (Boosalis, 2015), just as in the Niger Delta and Bayelsa State in particular (Oyefusi, 2008).

At the individual level, youths have taken to cultism and its attendant proliferation of cult groups in the Niger Delta region (Table 5 below). Cultism is seen and utilised as a platform for gaining access to the wealth of the region through their linkage to the political elites who happen to be their patrons and through such linkages see cultism and the ensuing groups as a medium for securing protection. Some of these cult groups, at the peak of the Niger Delta crisis, transformed themselves into Pro-Niger Delta Insurgent Groups that seek economic prosperity of the region (Oriola, 2013).






Table 5: List of Cult Groups Banned Under the Secret Cult and Similar Activities Prohibition Law, 2004

Agbaye	Eagle Club	Neo-Black movement
Airwords	Egbe Dudu	Night Mates
Amazon	Eiye of Air Lords Fraternity	Nite Hawks
Baccaneers (Sea Lords)	Elegemface	Nite Rovers
Barracuda	Executioners	Odu Confraternity
Bas	Fangs	Osiri
Bees International	FF	Ostrich Fraternity
Big 20	Fliers	Panama Pyrate
Black Axe	Frigates	Pheonix
Black Beret Fraternity	Gentlemen’s Club	Predators
Black Brasserie	Green Berets Fraternity	Red Devils
Black Brothers	Hard Candies	Red Fishes
Black Cats	Hell’s Angels	Red Sea Horse
Black Cross	Hepos	Royal Queens
Black Ladies	Himalayas	Sailors
Black Ofals	Icelanders	Scavengers
Black Scorpions	Jaggare Confederation	Scorpion
Black Sword	KGB	Scorpion Fraternity
Blanchers	King Cobra	Sea Vipers
Black Bras	Klamkonfraternity Klansman	Soiree Fraternity
Blood Suckers	Ku Klux Klan	Soko
Brotherhood of Blood		Sunmen
Burkina Faso: Revolution Fraternity	Knite Cade	Temple of Eden Fraternity
	Mafia Lords	Thomas Sankara Boys
Canary	Mafiso Fraternity	Tikan Giants
	Malcom X	Trojan Horses fraternity
CappaVandetto	Maphites/Maphlate	Truth Seekers
Daughters of Jezebel	MgbaMgba Brothers	Twin Mate
DeyGbam	Mob Stab	Vikings
Dey Well	Musketeers Fraternity	Vipers
Dolphins	National Association of	Vultures
Dragons	Adventures	Walrus
Dreaded Friends of Friends	National Association of Sea	White Bishop
Blood Hunters	Dogs	

Osaghae, et al, 2011, p. 22

The enormity of youths and their conundrum in the Niger Delta became a grave concern when at the proclamation of the Amnesty Programme declared by the Yar Adua led Federal Government of Nigeria in 2009, insurgent groups mainly youths troop out in their thousands to be amnestied (30,000 ex-agitators with 822 females) where quantum of firearms were handed in and signed up

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for the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) (Abazie-Humphrey, 2014), even as previous exercises at Bori Camp, Port-Harcourt, Rivers State (Table 6 below) yielded appreciable firearms inflow.

Table 6:Firearms Submitted at Bori Camp, Port-Harcourt

Type of Firearm	No.
Assault rifles	778
AK-47s	324
Czech SA Vz 58	429
Hk C3	22
FN-FAL	22
Short-guns	13
Light machine guns	19
Beretta 125	12
MAT 49	2
Czech model 26	2
Sten MK 2	7
Machine guns	1
Czech model 59 (Rachol)	2
MG 36	1
Hunting rifles	3
Pistols	9
Revolvers	11
Craft weapons	17
Air guns	1
Total	1,675

Source Osaghae, et al, 2011, pp.23-24

The wane of the amnesty programme in Bayelsa State opened a new spectre among youths in Bayelsa State. Among the several adverse manifestations, the following cases are germane to the discussion here:

(a) Poor School Enrolment

The Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in 2009 created an illusion of a life of ‘awoof’ among youths by simply acquiring arms by whatever dubious means to cash in on the federal government’s Amnesty Programme of dropping of firearms in exchange for a monetary stipend of ₦100,000. The penchant to benefit maximally from such a largesse created a disdain for education; seeing education as a longer route to a life of comfort and prestige in society. Instead, youths drop out of school, venture into nefarious activities to get money to buy arms in order to catch in the Presidential Amnesty Programme.

As a consequence therefrom, available information from state and privately owned libraries in the state indicates an abysmally discouraging patronage; with library attendants on a daily basis either sleeping out their office hours or seen in discussion





clusters to while away the day. Equally worrisome is the downturn in school enrolment in the state as indicated in Table 7 below. For example, the enrolment figure for the year 2010 slightly dropped vis-à-vis the previous year in 2009. Also, poor enrolment in some LGAs was mostly affected, whereas enrolment in the capital city LGA (Yenagoa) instead appreciated, essentially because of the non-indigene factor.

The calibre of political appointees speaks volumes of the state of education in the state. Majority of the state commissioners and other political appointees such as Special Advisers (SAs), Senior Special Advisers (SSAs), etc, are barely educated with a number of them only with secondary education. What is worrisome here is that these barely educated political appointees constantly live a life of affluence with a huge followership that sees them as role models. Therefore, how do we convince upcoming generations that education is the key to success in the state, when they are surrounded by poor graduates and rich criminals? Toeing the lifestyles of such politicians has therefore become the routine among youths to the detriment of their education and future.

(b) **Culture of Begging**

A corollary to the above is the enthronement of a culture of begging; a practice referred to as 'I am loyal mentality or syndrome', which takes diverse colourations. First, it takes the form of loitering around the office premises or the residence of political appointees as early as 5am through late into the night for monetary or material rewards. The ugly and worrisome aspect to this is that political appointees are compelled to treat office files not in the office because of the madding crowd, but instead in the early hours of the morning between 2am-4am. It was reported that successive governors in Bayelsa State, especially Late D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha was compelled by this circumstance to travel out of the state with 'Ghana-must-go' bags stocked with files to be treated while away from the ever increasing youthful crowd that loitered around for his financial attention (Ikuli, 2007).

Secondly, it was a worrisome sight to behold in Bayelsa State in the recent past where youths during Christmas or other festive seasons besieged the office premises of political appointees to 'gbege' (a colloquial term for shaking politicians by way of ranting praises) politicians in expectant of monetary and other windfalls such as bags of rice, live chicken, goat, etc.

Thirdly, what a danger to the later life of a youth who is suddenly exposed to stupendous wealth hitherto had not managed a stipend as salary? The consequences are better imagined if the sudden wealth disappears for whatever reasons.

Finally, a follow-up to the worrisome state of a culture of begging in the state has been that storey buildings of political office holders are architecturally designed with their staircases directly linked to the kitchen either to enable them leave their homes through the kitchen and a back-gate unnoticed or to observe their meals unperturbed and away from the retinue of visitors. The culture of begging has since waned tremendously due to poor patronage; however, not without giving birth to other youth-rentier manifestations in the state






Table 7: Enrolment in Senior Secondary Schools by LGA in Bayelsa State

LGA	Gross Enrolment from SS 1-SS 3											
	2008/2009			2009/2010			2010/2011			2011/2012		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Brass	1,122	881	2,003	943	713	1,656	1,135	951	2,086	1,111	1,046	2,157
Ekeremor	2,452	1,839	4,291	2,606	1,594	4,200	2,762	1,854	4,616	2,482	1,744	4,226
Kolokuma/Opokuma	1,134	920	2,054	921	883	1,804	1,142	950	2,092	919	811	1,730
Nembe	896	690	1,586	719	700	1,419	910	475	1,385	993	873	1,866
Ogbia	2,963	2,389	5,352	2,839	2,549	5,388	2,983	2,510	5,493	3,106	2,785	5,891
Sagbama	2,851	2,183	5,034	2,994	2,078	5,072	2,866	2,240	5,106	2,912	2,589	5,501
Southern Ijaw	3,814	2,771	6,585	3,793	2,856	6,649	4,024	2,888	6,912	4,749	3,368	8,117
Yenagoa	4,676	4,143	8,819	4,698	4,402	9,100	4,786	4,353	9,139	7,680	7,626	15,306
Total	19,908	15,816	35,724	19,513	15,775	35,288	20,608	16,221	36,829	23,952	20,842	44,794

Source: Ministry of Education, B/S





(c) Spate of Kidnapping/Hostage-taking/Sea Piracy

The low patronage from the begging syndrome has graduated to other ugly trends. One of such has been the spectre of kidnapping that has presently eaten deep into the fabric of Bayelsa State. It is a common phenomenon in the state and a concern to the authorities. Kidnapping is on the increase basically for economic reasons; the desire to continually benefit from the perceived oil wealth in the region which youths perceived to have been cornered by their erstwhile political godfathers. Therefore, the political class becomes their prime target to get at the oil wealth in the state. What is worrisome today is that kidnapping with its hitherto reasons as a political tool within the framework of a general liberation struggle, has since given way to a new habit of crime for purely economic gains (Akpan, 2010, Oriola, 2013). Bayelsa State has its own bitter share of kidnapping episodes in the recent past as seen from Table 8. It is such disturbing state of affairs that compelled Ngwama (2014, p.133) to posit that,

The significant impact of kidnapping and other associated crimes is becoming worrisome and perplexing not only to Nigerians but to the international community. This has heightened the fear of foreigners, especially international investors; thereby threatening the foundation of economic development...The kidnapping of all manner of persons has gained ascendancy in Nigeria. A malady previously unknown to the people has rapidly become domesticated. In the last ten years, the volatile oil rich regions of the Niger Delta witnessed this phenomenon on a large scale with the target being mostly expatriates and Nigerians in the oil business...

(d) Oil Theft and Proliferation of Artisanal Refineries

The youth bulge and the worrisome state of unemployment in Bayelsa State present further leakages to the economy of the state with far reaching impacts on youth education in Bayelsa State. Fundamentally, the oil sector not only allures but it is lucrative as well in attracting youths to quick money and life of comfort. Therefore, the notoriety in oil theft and upsurge in artisanal refineries in the state is not only understandable (Sibiri, 2015), it is a venture highly patronised by other key players as the Joint Military Task Force (JTF), the Nigerian Navy, politicians, their international collaborators, etc, that undertake commercial oil bunkering business (Ascher., 1999; Clark, 2008; TheWeek, 2008). Lewis (1996, p.90) was specific in this direction when he states that “petroleum smuggling was largely the province of senior military officers and a few civilian associates...” Youths only play an insignificant part, especially supportive roles in the business. What is of concern here is that the exposure to sudden wealth at a youthful age attracts among others diverse consequences; of which poor morale, despised attraction and concentration in education chores are commonplace.





Table 8: Cases of Kidnapping/Hostage Taking/Sea Piracy in Bayelsa State

Nature of Case	Date Reported	Location of Case	Hostages/Victims & Their Origin	Date Released	Reason for Action
Kidnapping	03/03/04	Beseni, B/S	13 Hostages	08/03/04	TNC Security Staff vs. Youth Clash
Hostage taking	19/12/05	Peretoru, B/S	42 Hostages	03/01/06	Impeachment of B/S Speaker/Governor
Hostage taking	15/12/05	Swali, B/S	14 Expatriates & 1 Nigerian	23/02/06	Arrest of one militant in PH
Sea Piracy	19/01/06	Sagbama, B/S	6 Policemen	19/02/07	No source of Livelihood
Militant attack	10/05/07	Otueke, B/S	16 Victims	23/05/07	Detention of Alamieyeseigha
Kidnapping	23/05/07	Akassa, B/S	9 Expatriates staff of Texaco	08/06/07	Oil Exploitation Production without Development of the Area
Kidnapping	31/07/07	Amarata, B/S	11 Yr. old son of a member of BSHA	04/08/07	Welfare of Militants
Kidnapping	08/08/07	Gbarain, B/S	Mother of the Speaker of BSHA	22/08/07	Welfare of Militants
Kidnapping	18/08/07	Akassa, B/S	Mother of the Speaker of BSHA	07/09/07	Welfare of Militants
Kidnapping	08/10/07	Odi, B/S	1 Nigerian	15/10/07	Ransom
Kidnapping	15/10/07	SILGA, B/S	1 Nigerian	15/10/07	Ransom
Kidnapping	25/08/12	Okordia	King Richard Seiba	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	17/12/12	Odioma, Brass	4 Koreans and 2 Nigerians	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	14/01/13	Korokorosei	MrsEtinah Friday Benson (Mother of Speaker, BSHA)	Nil	Accused to Oporoma High Court, Yenagoa
Sea Piracy	21/03/13	Amatu-1, River	Robbed two fishermen of outboard engines	Nil	Accused charged to Court No.7, Yenagoa
Kidnapping	29/01/13	Ebetebiri,	Mrs Esther Akpe (Mother of the Majority Leader, BSHA)	Nil	Suspects reprimanded in prison custody
Kidnapping	25/05/13	Otiotio Road	Anne BekeyeiZiworitin	Nil	Accused charged to High Court 2,
Kidnapping	23/08/13	Opuama Com	Staff of SIDONI Company	Nil	₦1,500,000.00k ransom recovered and accused charged to court
Kidnapping	25/09/13	Akasa River	Crew of MT.JENIFER Vessel	Nil	Accused charged to court
Armed Robbery	23/12/13	Swali Com	Francis Joshua	Nil	Accused charged to court
Kidnapping	26/12/13	Nikton Rd	Jimimah Clement Ene	Nil	Accused charged to Court No.2
Kidnapping	23/02/14	Otuoke Com	Chief NitabaiInengite (foster father to President Goodluck E. Jonathan)	12/03/14	Ransom
Kidnapping	06/03/14	Diebu Com	MrsEbitimi Salvation	Nil	Under investigation

Source: Oghoghomeh&Ironkwe, 2012, p.187; NPF, Anti-Kidnapping Unit, Bayelsa State Command, Yenagoa

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(e) **Rentierism and the Female Youth**

Naturally, women are industrious and home keepers and builders. As Golding (2003, p.4) British novelist, playwright and poet observes:

I think women are foolish to pretend they are equal to men; they are far superior and always have been. Whatever you give a woman, she will make greater. If you give her sperm, she will give you a baby, if you give her a house, she will give you a home. If you give her groceries, she will give you a meal. If you give her a smile, she will give you her heart. She multiplies and enlarges what is given to her.

Paradoxically, however, in a rentier economy such germane roles are either undermined or thwarted to suit other purposes. Aside that, male and female youths are not opportuned to the same but to engendering gender disparities in economic opportunities, fewer women work in the oil sector (UNECA, 2011; Ross, 2008, 2012; Wilson, 2012; Kotsadam&Tolonen, 2015), and as Sommers (2009, p.27) observe that,

...when other options fail, prostitution may be the only means of survival, and it is a perilous, if seemingly unavoidable, path...the economic value of sexuality for adolescent girls in Africa is particularly important because they have fewer market opportunities than married women and less money than boys.

The propensity for the female youth to take to prostitution as alluded above is made ever green by the presence of natural resources and their attendant rentier effects. It is known that oil TNC workers in host communities are availed with some easy cash to spend around and the female youth are the prey that easily get attracted to their baits. The consequences therefrom are better imagined; the life of promiscuity, single parenting, broken marriages, STDs, HIV/AIDs pandemics, etc, all of which possess properties that are inimical to the education of the female youth (Sommers, 2010, p.327). The perverse impacts of these trends are common sights to behold among oil host communities in Bayelsa State for several years; with only insignificant female youths taking to alternative means of survival especially the service sector with ICT (e.g. pay phone business) rendering the most support (Anugwom, 2007).

Conclusion

This paper carried out a survey on the presence of natural resources in Bayelsa State, especially as it relates to youths' disdain for education. It employed both primary and secondary sources of data collection. The population of the research comprised of mainly selected communities of Bayelsa State. These communities were administered questionnaire with which information was extracted.

The paper concludes that the presence of natural resources in Bayelsa State comes with it a number of discomfoting properties, especially on the youth population of the state. These defects include dislike for hard-work, education, reading culture, desire for quick money and the ensuing negative consequences on the state such as the proliferation of cultism, hostage-taking,





etc. This culminates in a nonchalant feeling of where one's income is got from. The notoriety of this is enormous even as elders of communities and their subjects are 'colour blind' to the source of wealth of their well-to-do elites. Amidst such a scenario in the state, income is no longer the reward for industriousness but to circumstances, change and location, etc (Beblawi, 1987).

In the light of these outcomes, the following recommendations capable of reducing the effects of rentierism on youth education in Bayelsa State are proffered:

1. Youth bulge is not a burden but represents a golden opportunity for economic growth. The government of Bayelsa State must invest in her youths to benefit from the huge youth cohort in the state (ECA, 2009; Marsland, 2011). Budgetary allocations to the education sector be reviewed upward to care for the youth bulge experienced in the state,
2. Bayelsa State must, as a matter of urgency, return to agriculture in order to emphasise the place of hard work as the main source of income and de-emphasise the current reliance on oil rent,
3. Youth re-orientations must be deliberately pursued wherein the value of a reading culture and skill development be reinvigorated (Johanson&Adams, 2004),
4. Barriers to youth inclusion/integration (institutional, legal, etc) into the economy should be removed,
5. There is the need to enthrone a culture of prudence by all and sundry, especially the political class. There is also the need, in this respect, for the political class to exhibit a less flamboyant life style in the society to avoid the culture of begging,
6. Social infrastructure such as good road network, good drinking water, stable power, affordable education, employment opportunities, etc, should be provided all over the state. This measure would curbe youth migration to urban centres which usually amounts to youth bulges with the attendant social vices/ills..
7. The school curriculum from secondary to university education in the state should be made to create curriculum-job placement targets so as to avoid the problem of unemployment in the state (Egbe, 2016),
8. Finally, the subject of this discourse should be extended unto two strands: (a) Niger Delta region wide survey on the impact of natural resource endowment on youth education, and (b) to further extend this discourse to uncover youth disdain for education in societies lacking in natural resources. This is because there are several instances among societies in Africa where natural resources are lacking, yet youth display lack of interest in education.

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
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


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


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


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


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